9781107440951-1107440955-Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria (African Studies, Series Number 130)

Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria (African Studies, Series Number 130)

ISBN-13: 9781107440951
ISBN-10: 1107440955
Author: A. Carl LeVan
Publication date: 2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Format: Paperback 308 pages
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ISBN-13: 9781107440951
ISBN-10: 1107440955
Author: A. Carl LeVan
Publication date: 2016
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Format: Paperback 308 pages

Summary

Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria (African Studies, Series Number 130) (ISBN-13: 9781107440951 and ISBN-10: 1107440955), written by authors A. Carl LeVan, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2016. With an overall rating of 4.1 stars, it's a notable title among other books. You can easily purchase or rent Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria (African Studies, Series Number 130) (Paperback) from BooksRun, along with many other new and used books and textbooks. And, if you're looking to sell your copy, our current buyback offer is $0.3.

Description

What are the conditions for good governance in Africa, and why do many democracies still struggle with persistent poverty? Drawing on a historical study of Nigeria since independence, this book argues that the structure of the policy-making process explains variations in government performance better than other commonly cited factors, such as oil, colonialism, ethnic diversity, foreign debt, and dictatorships. The author links the political structure of the policy process to patterns of government performance over half a century to show that the key factor is not simply the status of the regime as a dictatorship or a democracy, but rather it is the structure of the policy-making process by which different policy demands are included or excluded. By identifying political actors with the leverage to prevent policy change and extract concessions, empirical tests demonstrate how these "veto players" systematically affect the performance of two broad categories of public policy. This Madisonian dilemma has important implications for African countries struggling with the institutional trade-offs presented by different regimes.

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