9780521644150-0521644151-The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)

The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)

ISBN-13: 9780521644150
ISBN-10: 0521644151
Author: Daniel W. Drezner
Publication date: 1999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Format: Paperback 364 pages
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ISBN-13: 9780521644150
ISBN-10: 0521644151
Author: Daniel W. Drezner
Publication date: 1999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Format: Paperback 364 pages

Summary

The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65) (ISBN-13: 9780521644150 and ISBN-10: 0521644151), written by authors Daniel W. Drezner, was published by Cambridge University Press in 1999. With an overall rating of 3.9 stars, it's a notable title among other Economic Policy & Development (Economics, International & World Politics, Politics & Government, Political Science) books. You can easily purchase or rent The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65) (Paperback) from BooksRun, along with many other new and used Economic Policy & Development books and textbooks. And, if you're looking to sell your copy, our current buyback offer is $0.82.

Description

The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

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