9780521642262-0521642264-Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

ISBN-13: 9780521642262
ISBN-10: 0521642264
Author: Torben Iversen
Publication date: 1999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Format: Hardcover 238 pages
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Book details

ISBN-13: 9780521642262
ISBN-10: 0521642264
Author: Torben Iversen
Publication date: 1999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Format: Hardcover 238 pages

Summary

Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (ISBN-13: 9780521642262 and ISBN-10: 0521642264), written by authors Torben Iversen, was published by Cambridge University Press in 1999. With an overall rating of 4.1 stars, it's a notable title among other Comparative (Economics, Economic Policy & Development, Labor & Industrial Relations, Macroeconomics, Unemployment, Human Resources) books. You can easily purchase or rent Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (Hardcover) from BooksRun, along with many other new and used Comparative books and textbooks. And, if you're looking to sell your copy, our current buyback offer is $0.3.

Description

This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.

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