Regulatory bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and antitrust policy (MIT studies in American politics and public policy ; 6)

The debate over whether the FTC does too much or too little raises the fundamental question of how its caseload is determined—a question which is explored at length in this book.
The volume, the sixth in the series MIT Studies in American Politics and Public Policy, reveals how the FTC's organizational arrangements affect the distribution of power among the participants in the case selection process, the manner in which information is gathered, the types of data collected, the kinds of policy issues discussed, the choices that are made, and the ways decisions are implemented.
The material covered in the book is based on more than 100 interviews the author conducted with commissioners, agency lawyers, economists, the executive director, secretary, and other FTC staff, as well as with Capitol Hill staff, members of the private bar, and agency observers. The Freedom of Information Act was used when necessary to gain access to documents.
The book gives particular attention to the FTC's shift of its resources toward the prosecution of "big" structural cases—cases that are designed to attack fundamental market imperfections on an industry-wide basis.