9780262033497-0262033496-Democratic Constitutional Design And Public Policy: Analysis And Evidence

Democratic Constitutional Design And Public Policy: Analysis And Evidence

ISBN-13: 9780262033497
ISBN-10: 0262033496
Author: Roger D. Congleton, Birgitta Swedenborg
Publication date: 2006
Publisher: Mit Pr
Format: Hardcover 373 pages
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Book details

ISBN-13: 9780262033497
ISBN-10: 0262033496
Author: Roger D. Congleton, Birgitta Swedenborg
Publication date: 2006
Publisher: Mit Pr
Format: Hardcover 373 pages

Summary

Democratic Constitutional Design And Public Policy: Analysis And Evidence (ISBN-13: 9780262033497 and ISBN-10: 0262033496), written by authors Roger D. Congleton, Birgitta Swedenborg, was published by Mit Pr in 2006. With an overall rating of 4.5 stars, it's a notable title among other books. You can easily purchase or rent Democratic Constitutional Design And Public Policy: Analysis And Evidence (Hardcover) from BooksRun, along with many other new and used books and textbooks. And, if you're looking to sell your copy, our current buyback offer is $0.3.

Description

The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted―election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform―are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies. Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's "economic constitution," and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process.ContributorsJohn C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, Hülya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bjørn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast
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