9780275935863-0275935868-The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness

The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness

ISBN-13: 9780275935863
ISBN-10: 0275935868
Author: Canfield, John V.
Publication date: 1990
Publisher: Praeger
Format: Hardcover 264 pages
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Book details

ISBN-13: 9780275935863
ISBN-10: 0275935868
Author: Canfield, John V.
Publication date: 1990
Publisher: Praeger
Format: Hardcover 264 pages

Summary

Acknowledged authors Canfield, John V. wrote The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness comprising 264 pages back in 1990. Textbook and eTextbook are published under ISBN 0275935868 and 9780275935863. Since then The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness textbook was available to sell back to BooksRun online for the top buyback price or rent at the marketplace.

Description

John Canfield here presents a penetrating study of the self and self-consciousness from the point of view of contemporary analytic philosophy. Taking as his starting point Wittgenstein's views on the nature of the self, Canfield explains Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy and his way of looking at language. He also explores significant non-Wittgensteinian philosophical literature including the widespread debate over criteria of personal identity and basic assumptions about the I of such expressions as I think. The second half of the book examines how we fix or ascertain certain beliefs about ourselves--a problem not previously discussed by analytic philosophers.

Canfield begins by examining traditional theories that take the self to be a fiction of some sort. He goes on to analyze our deep-seated existential belief in self--a belief that, he notes, can coexist with a theoretical denial of self's existence. A central chapter of the book attempts to delineate clearly Wittgenstein's view of the I as a grammatical fiction. In addressing the large literature on criteria of personal identity, Canfield argues that a central assumption of that work--the notion of judging by intuition in puzzle cases--is mistaken. Turning his attention to forms of self-consciousness, Canfield demonstrates that the I of gut-level belief is categorically heterogeneous and, in part, fictional. Written with a minimum of jargon, this book will interest Wittgensteinian scholars as well as philosophers, social scientists, and psychoanalysts involved in the study of the self.

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