9780262529242-0262529246-The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

ISBN-13: 9780262529242
ISBN-10: 0262529246
Edition: Reprint
Author: Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.
Publication date: 1998
Publisher: The MIT Press
Format: Paperback 294 pages
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Book details

ISBN-13: 9780262529242
ISBN-10: 0262529246
Edition: Reprint
Author: Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.
Publication date: 1998
Publisher: The MIT Press
Format: Paperback 294 pages

Summary

Acknowledged authors Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K. wrote The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) comprising 294 pages back in 1998. Textbook and eTextbook are published under ISBN 0262529246 and 9780262529242. Since then The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) textbook was available to sell back to BooksRun online for the top buyback price or rent at the marketplace.

Description

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.

In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

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