9780262041690-0262041693-Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice

Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice

ISBN-13: 9780262041690
ISBN-10: 0262041693
Edition: 1/27/99
Author: Prajit K. Dutta
Publication date: 1999
Publisher: The MIT Press
Format: Hardcover 476 pages
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Book details

ISBN-13: 9780262041690
ISBN-10: 0262041693
Edition: 1/27/99
Author: Prajit K. Dutta
Publication date: 1999
Publisher: The MIT Press
Format: Hardcover 476 pages

Summary

Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice (ISBN-13: 9780262041690 and ISBN-10: 0262041693), written by authors Prajit K. Dutta, was published by The MIT Press in 1999. With an overall rating of 3.9 stars, it's a notable title among other Theory (Economics) books. You can easily purchase or rent Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice (Hardcover) from BooksRun, along with many other new and used Theory books and textbooks. And, if you're looking to sell your copy, our current buyback offer is $0.58.

Description

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate aswell as business school students. This text is the first to provideboth a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety ofreal-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law.

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

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